“It is a misfortune to human nature, when religion is given by a conqueror. The Mahometan religion, which speaks only by the sword, acts still upon men with that destructive spirit with which it was founded.”

Montesquieu

One of the most misguided yet oft-repeated assertions made by religious apologists is that religion is required for morality. The claim is made that without belief in God, there is no incentive for humans to behave well; that without a divine rulebook, it is impossible for us to know right from wrong. This assumption still resonates strongly today; indeed, it remains standard practice for religious institutions to be granted charitable status, and thus avoid paying taxes. These institutions are presumed to be doing good by virtue of being religious, while secular charities have to prove themselves. As one might imagine, many of these religious ‘charities’ end up being nothing of the sort. There are innumerable cases of Islamic charities in the West which have been found to support jihadist terrorism, including in Ireland.

The claim that religion is necessary for morality is false, as plainly demonstrated by the millions of non-religious people who lead moral lives, as well as the millennia-old tradition of secular moral philosophy. We do not need threats of punishment in hell or promises of heavenly rewards to behave well, but simply a love of humanity. We do not require Bronze Age scripture to discern right from wrong, but merely a consideration for the well-being of others. Such is the first purpose of this article – to refute the notion that religion is required for morality, with reference to Western philosophy. To do so, we will lean heavily upon the words of the liberal philosopher A.C. Grayling. We will then proceed to the second purpose – that is, to demonstrate how religion can be an obstacle to morality, with a specific focus on Islam.

Indeed, when it comes to Islam, the claim that religion is necessary for morality is an exact inversion of the truth. Islam poisons morality: it glorifies servitude to a celestial sadist (Allah) and prescribes brutal punishments for innocuous acts, such as homosexuality and pre-marital sex; it encourages Muslims to see themselves as superior beings and to dehumanise non-Muslims as kuffar; it incites Muslims to wage war upon non-Muslims until they convert, promising that martyrs will be rewarded with dewy-eyed maidens in heaven; it makes absurd and absolutist claims to the truth, persecuting blasphemers, ‘heretics’ and apostates; and of course, it treats half of our species – women – with the utmost disdain. To make this point, we will refer to Sheikh Ahmad Musa Jibril, who embraces the violent supremacism of Islam.

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Why religion isn’t required for morality

Stated simply, the moral argument for religion is that there can be no moral code unless it is laid down, policed, punished and rewarded by a deity. Liberal religious apologists would prefer to state the case differently: that morality is the response of a loving creation to its loving creator; that because God is so nice, we should be nice to each other. The existence of moral evil (the tsunamis and childhood cancers) raises questions about the love and niceness of the deity if there is one, but the positively spun versions of the moral argument still ultimately claim that morality is groundless unless ordained, and its breaches sanctioned, by a deity.

The argument that there can be no morality unless it is policed by a deity is refuted by the existence of good atheists. Arguably, atheists count themselves among the most careful moral thinkers, because in the absence of an externally imposed morality, they recognise the duty to examine their views, choices and actions, and how they should behave towards others.

Consider the thinkers of classical antiquity – Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, the Stoics and others – and one will see that their examination of ethics was not premised on the belief that morals were a matter of divine command, nor that they were responding to the requirements of a deity, still less that they were seeking reward in an afterlife or the avoidance of punishment. Their example illustrates the falsity of the claim that moral principles can only come from an external agency.

Nor were these thinkers persuaded that the only basis for the objectivity of ethical principles is that they are the product of a divine will. In his Critique of Practical Reason (1788), the German philosopher Immanuel Kant demonstrated one way to underwrite the objectivity of moral law: he argued that reason identifies the Categorical Imperative underpinning our moral duties (“act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”), and that this would be so whether or not a deity exists.

There is an important point implicit in the Kantian view. The fact that anyone commands us to do something is not by itself a reason why we should do it. The action in question has itself to be independently worthy of doing, or there has to be a reason other than someone’s merely wishing or commanding that we do it, to serve as a genuine reason for doing it.

A related consideration, called the ‘Euthyphro Problem’, is this: is an act wrong because God says it is, or is it forbidden by God because it is wrong? If the latter, then there is a reason independently of the will of God that makes the act wrong. But then there is morality without god, and so the moral argument for religion fails. If the former, then anything God commands (murder and rape, for example) would be morally good just because he commands it; and then, as Leibniz put it in his Discourse on Metaphysics (1686):

In saying, therefore, that things are not good according to any standard of goodness, but simply by the will of God, it seems to me that one destroys, without realizing it, all the love of God and all his glory; for why praise him for what he has done, if he would be equally praiseworthy in doing the contrary? Where will be his justice and his wisdom if he has only a certain despotic power, if arbitrary will takes the place of reasonableness, and if in accord with the definition of tyrants, justice consists in that which is pleasing to the most powerful?

Behind the belief that God is required for moral principles is the further belief that God’s wrath is required for people to follow them. There must be an ultimate sanction for one’s failure to live morally; otherwise, there is no answer to the moral sceptic who asks, “Why should I be moral? Why should I not lie, kill or steal?”.

The examples of the good atheist and the classical philosopher also rebut this view. There are many sound reasons why we should seek to live responsibly, with generosity and sympathy towards others, and with continence, sound judgement and decency in our own lives. Indeed, for our species to survive and live well, it is imperative that we treat each other as we would like to be treated. On an individual level, leading a moral life – one that minimises harm and promotes human well-being – is indispensable for being a truly happy and fulfilled person. We don’t require threats of punishment to avoid lying, killing or stealing; rather, we need only care enough about our fellow man and our own self-fulfilment. Here is how Albert Einstein put it:

A man’s ethical behaviour should be based effectually on sympathy, education and social ties; no religious basis is necessary. Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death.

There is no need for an external enforcer to make us take morality seriously. People should strive to be moral because they see the point of it, not because they are being watched and will be rewarded or punished according to their observance of the rules. In the latter sort of world, one would not be able to tell the difference between those who are acting out of principle and those who are acting out of prudence. How much better is a world comprised of volunteers, not slaves!

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Common arguments for objective morality

Earlier, we touched upon the Kantian view of morality, which contends that moral principles can be derived from rational reflection on the human condition. However, objective morality without religion can be argued from various other philosophical perspectives. We will summarise these perspectives here.

Ethical Naturalism

This position holds that moral values and duties can be grounded in natural facts about the world, such as human well-being, flourishing, or rationality. For example, Sam Harris, a prominent advocate of this view, argues that moral values can be understood in terms of promoting the well-being of conscious creatures. From this standpoint, morality can be seen as objective because certain actions reliably lead to better or worse outcomes for individuals and society as a whole, regardless of religious beliefs.

Social Contract Theory

This theory, championed by philosophers like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, posits that moral rules are the result of rational individuals coming together to form social contracts for mutual benefit and protection. According to this view, morality is objective in the sense that it arises from agreements that people make to govern their behaviour, irrespective of religious beliefs.

Evolutionary Ethics

Evolutionary psychologists and biologists argue that certain moral instincts and behaviours have evolved in humans due to natural selection, as they enhance survival and reproduction. While our moral intuitions may have evolved, they are not necessarily dependent on religious doctrines. Thus, morality can be considered objective insofar as it reflects innate human tendencies shaped by evolutionary pressures.

Rationalism and Intuitionism

Some philosophers argue for objective morality based on reason or intuition. Rationalists, such as Kant, contend that moral principles can be derived through rational reflection on the nature of human dignity and autonomy. Intuitionists, like G.E. Moore, argue that moral truths are self-evident and can be intuited through reflective awareness. These views suggest that moral facts exist independently of religious beliefs.

Cultural Universality

Anthropological and sociological studies show that many moral principles and values are shared across diverse cultures and religions. This observation suggests that there may be universal moral truths that are independent of religious doctrines, providing support for objective morality without reference to religion.

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Why Islam is the enemy of morality

In the civilised world, one of the most important moral principles is that of tolerance. The UNESCO Declaration of Principles on Tolerance defines tolerance as respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world’s cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication, and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Consistent with respect for human rights, the practice of tolerance means that one is free to adhere to one’s own convictions and accepts that others are free to adhere to theirs. It means accepting that human beings have the right to live in peace and to be as they are. It also means that one’s views are not to be imposed on others.

This noble moral precept is completely at odds with Islam, which preaches extreme hatred and intolerance of non-Muslims and denies their freedom to follow a religion other than Islam. To illustrate this point, we will provide a few examples courtesy of Sheikh Ahmad Musa Jibril, who does not sugarcoat the faith.

In ‘They Abuse Allah’, Sheikh Jibril explains how Islam commands Muslims to hate non-Muslims not for what they do, but for their disbelief (kufr) or belief in other gods (shirk). It teaches that non-Muslims, by rejecting Islam, are abusing Allah – and that this abuse is immeasurably worse than anything they may do to Muslims, from killing them to occupying their lands. Indeed, it is blasphemy to hate non-Muslims primarily for their aggression towards Muslims rather than their disbelief, for this is to elevate their abuse of man over their abuse of Allah; it is to say that the honour of Allah’s creation is more important than the honour of Allah himself. This is the basis for Islamic terrorism, however much ‘moderates’ may deny it.

Similarly, in ‘The Enemies of Allah’, Sheikh Jibril explains how Allah is the enemy of the disbelievers, i.e. non-Muslims. The Qur’an doesn’t just say that Allah hates disbelief, but the disbelievers themselves; ‘moderate’ apologists who claim otherwise are kidding themselves. Allah hates those who engage in disbelief, not just the concept of it. A Muslim cannot be the friend of non-Muslims, for they are the ones whom Allah hates; and a Muslim must love what Allah loves and hate what Allah hates. A non-Muslim may sacrifice everything for his fellow man, but ultimately, his rejection of Islam means that he is destined to burn in hell. The non-Muslim’s good deeds cannot save him, for nothing is worse in the sight of Allah than disbelief.

Sheikh Jibril subscribes to Sunnism, the dominant sect of Islam. Among Sunni Muslims, there is a widespread contempt for the Shi’a minority, whom they regard as heretics (rafidis) for their rejection of the Rashidun Caliphate that succeeded Muhammad. Shi’a Muslims believe that the Caliphate was promised by Muhammad to his son-in-law Ali ibn Abi Talib at Ghadir Khumm, and that upon Muhammad’s death three months later, Abu Bakr ibn Abi Quhafa and Umar ibn al-Khattab – two of his early followers (sahaba) – conspired to deny Ali his rightful place as Caliph. Sunni Muslims consider Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman ibn Affan (the third Caliph) to be “rightly-guided”; thus, they do not take kindly to their denunciation by the Shi’a.

This Sunni fear and loathing of their Shi’a brethren played a central role in the murderous carnage that unfolded in Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003. To refresh the reader’s memory in this regard, we will draw upon the elegant prose of the late Christopher Hitchens from God Is Not Great.

Immediately upon the downfall of the Ba’athist regime in Iraq in April 2003, the supporters of Al-Qaeda, led by a Jordanian jailbird named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, launched a frenzied campaign of murder and sabotage. They not only slew unveiled women, secular journalists and teachers. They not only set off bombs in Christian churches and shot or maimed Christians who made and sold alcohol. They not only made a video of the mass shooting and throat-cutting of a contingent of Nepalese guest workers, who were assumed to be Hindu and thus beyond all consideration. These atrocities might be counted as more or less routine. They directed the most toxic part of their campaign of terror at their fellow Muslims.

The mosques and funeral processions of the long-oppressed Shi’a minority were blown up. Pilgrims coming long distances to the newly accessible shrines at Karbala and Najaf did so at the risk of their lives. In a letter to his leader Osama bin Laden, Zarqawi gave the two main reasons for this extraordinarily evil policy. In the first place, the Shi’a were heretics who did not take the correct Sunni-Salafist path of purity. They were thus a fitting prey for the truly holy. Secondly, if a religious war could be induced within Iraqi society, the plans of the “Crusader” West could be set at naught. The obvious hope was to ignite a counter-response from the Shi’a themselves, which would drive Sunni Arabs into the arms of their bin Ladenist “protectors”.

And, despite some noble appeals for restraint from the Shi’a Grand Ayatollah Sistani, it did not prove very difficult to elicit such a response. Before long, Shi’a death squads, often garbed in police uniforms, were killing and torturing random members of the Sunni sect. The surreptitious influence of the neighbouring Islamic Republic of Iran was not difficult to detect, and in some Shi’a-majority areas too it became dangerous to be an unveiled woman or a secular person. Iraq boasts quite a long history of inter-marriage and inter-communal cooperation. But after a few years of this hateful dialectic, an atmosphere of misery, distrust, hostility and sectarianism had enveloped society. Once again, Islam had poisoned morality.

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The evil concept of hell

If there is one Islamic concept which flies in the face of morality, it is that of hell. In Sahih Muslim, Muhammad states that Allah created Adam – and thus, man – in his image. This means that Allah created us as we are and must know that humans respond best to empirical evidence, in terms of determining what is real. However, he doesn’t provide us with empirical evidence of his existence, yet will send us to hell to be tortured for eternity if we don’t believe in and worship him. These gruesome punishments are spelled out in the Qur’an:

Those who reject Our Signs, We shall soon cast them into the Fire. As often as their skins are roasted through, We shall change them for fresh skins, that they may taste the penalty. For Allah is Exalted in Power, All-Wise. (4:56)

As for those who disbelieve, garments of fire will be cut out for them, boiling water will be poured down over their heads. With it will melt or vanish away what is within their bellies, as well as [their] skins. (22:19-20)

And for them are hooked rods of iron [to punish them]. Every time they seek to get away therefrom, from anguish, they will be driven back therein, and [it will be] said to them: “taste the torment of burning!” (22:21-22)

The idea that anyone should be subjected to an eternity of such horrific torments for basing their beliefs on reason and evidence, rather than faith and dogma, is absurd and wicked in equal measure. Even worse, according to the Qur’an, it is Allah himself who causes people to not believe in him! “He sendeth whom He will astray and guideth whom He will” (16:93). In other words, Allah will torture people in hell for something that he makes them do. Needless to say, this is not the behaviour of a just god; rather, it is pure sadism.

One must state it plainly: telling children that they will burn in hell if they don’t believe is a form of abuse. If we really internalise the concept, it can traumatise us for life. At the back of our minds, many Ex-Muslims still live in perpetual dread that the worst fate imaginable awaits us when we die. Even though we no longer believe in Allah, we can still have anxiety attacks about his punishment for rejecting Islam. By employing threats of violence, Islam disqualifies itself from any claim to morality. To finish with a clip of the great Dan Barker: